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Abstract 
A view advanced in the aftermath of the late-2000s financial crisis is that lower than 
optimal interest rates lead to excessive risk taking by financial intermediaries. We 
evaluate this view in a quantitative dynamic model in which interest rate policy affects 
risk taking by changing the amount of safe bonds that intermediaries use as collateral in 
the repo market. In this model with properly-priced collateral, lower than optimal interest 
rates reduce risk taking. We also consider the possibility that intermediaries can augment 
their collateral by issuing assets whose risk is underestimated by credit rating agencies, as 
was observed prior to the crisis. In the presence of such mispriced collateral, lower than 
optimal interest rates contribute to excessive risk taking and amplify the severity of 
recessions. 
JEL classification: E44, E52, G28, D53 
Bank classification: Transmission of monetary policy; Financial system regulation and 
policies 
Résumé 
La crise financière de la fin des années 2000 en a amené plusieurs à soutenir que des taux 
d’intérêt inférieurs au taux optimal encouragent la prise de risques excessifs par les 
intermédiaires financiers. Pour déterminer ce qu’il en est, les auteurs recourent à un 
modèle dynamique quantitatif dans lequel la politique de taux d’intérêt influe sur la prise 
de risque en modifiant le volume des obligations sûres que les intermédiaires utilisent en 
garantie d’emprunts sur le marché des pensions. Lorsque les garanties sont évaluées 
correctement, le maintien de taux d’intérêt inférieurs au taux optimal réduit la prise de 
risque. Les auteurs examinent aussi la possibilité que les intermédiaires augmentent leur 
volume de garanties en émettant des actifs dont le risque est sous-estimé par les agences 
de notation, comme ce fut le cas avant la crise. En présence de garanties mal évaluées, de 
tels taux d’intérêt contribuent à la prise de risques excessifs et amplifient la gravité des 
récessions. 
Classification JEL : E44, E52, G28, D53 
Classification de la Banque : Transmission de la politique monétaire; Réglementation et 
politiques relatives au système financier 
 
 1 Introduction
The recent ￿nancial crisis has fostered interest in the link between monetary policy and the risk
taking behavior of ￿nancial intermediaries.1 When interest rates are low, intermediaries have
incentives to seek high returns in riskier assets. Over the last decade, ￿nancial intermediaries
have increasingly borrowed in the short-term sale and repurchase market￿ commonly known as the
repo market￿ to adjust their portfolio risk.2 Repo transactions are collateralized predominantly
by government bonds and take place at interest rates strongly in￿ uenced by monetary policy. This
suggests that policy can alter risk taking of intermediaries through its e⁄ects on the repo market.
In this paper, we examine the impact of monetary policy on risk taking in an environment where
intermediaries use collateralized repo transactions to adjust the riskiness of their portfolios. We
￿nd that, at low interest rates, scarce collateral limits repo transactions and, generally, reduces risk
taking by ￿nancial intermediaries. However, in the run-up to the recent crisis, ￿nancial innovation
allowed intermediaries to issue assets with misperceived safety and use them as collateral in repo
transactions.3 In our model, when intermediaries are able to issue misrated assets, low interest
rates contribute to excessive risk taking and amplify the severity of recessions.
The paper makes three main contributions. First, it develops a model with a collateralized
interbank lending market, in which interest rate policy in￿ uences risk taking of ￿nancial interme-
diaries. The novel aspect of the model is the important role of repo collateral in the transmission
mechanism from monetary policy to risk taking and the real economy. Second, the paper incor-
porates this mechanism into a dynamic general equilibrium framework and quantitatively assesses
its importance in the context of the U.S. economy. Third, we allow for the possibility of collat-
eral mispricing, due to misperceived safety of underlying asset, as was the case in the run-up to
the ￿nancial crisis, and show that such mispricing diminishes the ability of interest rate policy to
in￿ uence risk taking.
At the core of our analysis are ￿nancial intermediaries with limited liability who invest in safe
1For background on the role of monetary policy in the recent crisis, see Taylor (2009), Bernanke (2010) and
Svensson (2010). For a broader view of low interest rates and risk taking, see Carney (2010).
2A repo transaction is a sale of a security and a simultaneous agreement to repurchase the security at a future
date. Repos are secured loans in which the borrower receives money against collateral.
3Brunnermeier (2009) and Gorton and Metrick (2011) document that two changes in the banking system￿ repo
￿nancing and securitization￿ played an important role in the recent ￿nancial crisis. Increased short-term repo
￿nancing exposed intermediaries to sudden reductions in funding, while securitization allowed them to o⁄-load risks.
The latter paper also documents that securitized assets were often used as collateral in repo transactions.
2bonds and risky projects. Afterwards, intermediaries ￿nd out whether their projects are high-risk
or low-risk and reoptimize their portfolios using collateralized borrowing in the repo market. In
this environment, monetary policy in￿ uences risk taking directly, through a portfolio channel, and
indirectly, through a collateral channel. Changes in risk taking through the portfolio channel are
similar to those discussed in Allen and Gale (2000) and Rajan (2006). Namely, at low interest
rates, intermediaries with limited liability purchase fewer safe bonds and invest more into riskier
assets with a higher expected return. A main contribution of our paper is to consider the impact
of monetary policy on risk taking through the quantity of collateral. Intermediaries use safe bonds
as collateral in the repo market to increase or decrease their exposure to risky projects. At low
interest rates, collateral in the form of safe bonds is scarce and restricts risk taking by ￿nancial
intermediaries.
Empirically, Adrian and Shin (2010) document that collateralized repo transactions are an
important margin of portfolio adjustment for U.S. intermediaries. In our model, the repo market is
bene￿cial because it facilitates reallocation of resources between intermediaries in response to new
information about the riskiness of their portfolios. However, collateralized borrowing through the
repo market also allows intermediaries to take advantage of their limited liability by overinvesting
in risky projects. The role of the monetary authority is to set interest rate policy so as to mitigate
the moral hazard problem of intermediaries.
We embed the ￿nancial intermediation sector just outlined into a dynamic model with aggregate
and idiosyncratic uncertainty in which the monetary authority controls the real interest rate on
safe bonds.4 Households invest deposits and equity into ￿nancial intermediaries. Part of these
resources is used by intermediaries to fund risky projects, which are investments into the production
technologies of small ￿rms.5 Financial intermediaries can go bankrupt, in which case, payments to
its depositors are guaranteed by the government-funded deposit insurance. In addition, production
in the economy also takes place in equity-￿nanced non￿nancial ￿rms.6 In this environment, we
4Implicitly, we assume that the monetary authority is successful in ensuring price stability. In this context, we
consider whether the monetary authority can control risk taking of intermediaries through the real interest rates on
safe assets and examine the implications for the macroeconomy. Having nominal interest rates as a policy instrument
would enrich the policy insights, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
5In our model, the investment market is segmented in that households cannot invest directly in risky projects of
small ￿rms and are forced to use intermediaries. This is similar to Gale (2004). Noncorporate, non￿nancial ￿rms
are the data counterpart for the small ￿rms in our model. For simplicity, we do not model loans between ￿nancial
intermediaries and these ￿rms, but rather assume that intermediaries operate their production technologies directly.
6We model a non￿nancial sector to allow quantitative comparability of our model results to U.S. data.
3￿nd the optimal interest rate policy and consider the implications of lower than optimal interest
rates for risk taking and welfare. We say that risk taking of ￿nancial intermediaries is excessive if
investments in high-risk projects in the decentralized economy exceed the social optimum, de￿ned
as the solution to a social planner problem.
To shed light on the link between interest rates, risk taking and macroeconomic outcomes,
it is important to understand how ￿nancial intermediaries interact in the repo market. Each
period, initially identical ￿nancial intermediaries choose investments based on the return to safe
bonds and the expected return to risky projects. Then, intermediaries ￿nd out the riskiness of
their projects. High-risk projects have a larger unconditional variance of productivity shocks than
low-risk projects. Intermediaries with high-risk projects￿ call them high-risk intermediaries￿ have
higher expected productivity in an expansion and lower expected productivity in a contraction
relative to low-risk intermediaries. In an expansion, high-risk intermediaries trade their bonds on
the repo market in exchange for additional resources to be invested in high-risk projects. These
projects are relatively attractive from a social point of view due to their high expected return,
and are even more attractive from the intermediaries￿point of view because potential losses in the
event of a contraction are avoided through limited liability. Low-risk intermediaries, on the other
side of the repo transaction, accept bonds and reduce exposure to their risky projects, which have
lower expected returns. In an expansion, optimal policy restricts risk taking by high-risk ￿nancial
intermediaries by limiting the amount of collateral they have available for repo transactions. In a
contraction, optimal policy facilitates the ￿ ow of resources in the opposite direction, from high-risk
to low-risk intermediaries to minimize bankruptcy losses.
We calibrate our model￿ s parameters to match key characteristics of economic expansions and
contractions and of the ￿nancial sector in the U.S. economy. We ￿nd that, at the optimal interest
rate policy, the competitive equilibrium features excessive risk taking and lower welfare compared
to the social optimum. However, the welfare loss is small, at 0.04 percent of lifetime consumption.
In addition, we ￿nd that lower than optimal interest rates lead to less risk taking by ￿nancial
intermediaries.7 More speci￿cally, lowering bond returns raises risk taking through the portfolio
channel, but reduces risk taking through the collateral channel, since there are fewer bonds to be
7We measure risk taking as an average over expansions and contractions in a simulation of our model economy
calibrated to U.S. data. Later in the paper, we also discuss the cyclical behavior of risk taking.
4used in repo transactions. The collateral channel is quantitatively stronger because it constrains
high-risk intermediaries who have the strongest incentives to overinvest in risky projects.
In the model outlined so far, the requirement that repo transactions have to be collateralized
with safe bonds helps reduce moral hazard of intermediaries at low interest rates. It is well docu-
mented that, in the run-up to the recent ￿nancial crisis, some assets used as collateral in the repo
market were not truly safe (see Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2011) and Hoerdahl and King
(2008)).8 We consider a version of our model in which intermediaries issue private bonds which
are misrated as safe by credit rating agencies. As a result, these assets are accepted as collateral
in the repo market. We also allow for exogenous foreign demand for the domestic assets rated as
safe. This is consistent with evidence that, in the last decade, the U.S. has attracted excess world
savings from countries in search of safe assets (see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010)).
These additional features allow high-risk intermediaries to relax their collateral constraint and take
on more risk through the repo market. As a result, low interest rates lead to increased risk taking
by ￿nancial intermediaries and amplify the severity of recessions.
In the benchmark model￿ without misrated assets￿ the collateral channel provides a safeguard
against increased risk taking. Our model suggests that accurate risk assessment of collateral assets
is essential in maintaining the protective role of the collateral channel. This may be a promising
direction for regulatory changes. Beyond these policy implications, our model also generates a rich
set of predictions for the behavior of yield spreads and leverage over the business cycle. These
predictions are the result of endogenous portfolio choices by households and ￿nancial intermedi-
aries. In our model, the equity premium￿ the expected spread between equity and risk free bond
returns￿ is countercyclical and about 1.9 percent on average. The positive premium is consistent
with, but lower than, empirical evidence (see Mehra and Prescott (1985)). Moreover, leverage of
￿nancial intermediaries in our model￿ computed as the ratio of total assets to equity￿ is procycli-
cal, as in the data (see Adrian and Shin (2010)).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a more detailed overview of the related
8Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2011) document that riskier and less liquid collateral such as private-label
mortgage backed securities and asset backed securities were used in the repo market prior to the crisis. This type
of collateral disappeared from the repo market as the crisis unfolded. Similar evidence is provided by Hoerdahl and
King (2008).
5literature, then Section 3 presents the model and derives equilibrium properties. Section 4 out-
lines the methods we use to pin down our model￿ s parameters. Section 5 describes the various
experiments and the main results of the paper. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper contributes to the growing literature studying the risk taking channel of monetary policy.
The term was coined by Borio and Zhu (2008) to refer to the in￿ uence that monetary policy may
have on risk taking by ￿nancial intermediaries. Several papers ￿nd empirical evidence that, when
interest rates are low for an extended period, banks take on more risks.9 There are also theoretical
explorations of this link.10 Our paper complements this work, by evaluating the impact of lower
than optimal interest rates on risk taking in a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model
calibrated to the U.S. economy.
Our model encompasses the idea put forth in Rajan (2006) that, when interest rates fall, ￿nancial
intermediaries shift their investments from safe to riskier, and higher expected return, assets. In our
model, the portfolio channel captures these e⁄ects. However, we also show that, in evaluating the
monetary policy￿ s overall impact on risk taking, it is quantitatively important to consider its e⁄ects
on collateralized transactions in the repo market. In our model, changes in interest rate policy are
transmitted to the short-term borrowing market through the repo rate. The close relationship we
obtain between policy and the repo rate is supported by U.S. evidence, as shown in Bech, Klee,
and Stebunovs (2010). These authors also highlight the empirical importance of the repo market
for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
Our paper is closely related to Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Quer-
alto (2011).11 These authors consider the e⁄ects of credit policies (e.g. discount window lending,
equity injections) and macro prudential policies (e.g. subsidies to issuance of outside equity) on
9For example, Gambacorta (2009), Ioannidou, Ongena, and Peydr￿ (2009), JimØnez, Ongena, Peydr￿, and Saurina
(2009), Delis and Kouretas (2010) and Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-Ibane (2010) use data from di⁄erent
countries to show that banks grant riskier loans and soften lending standards when interest rates are low. de Nicol￿,
Dell￿ Ariccia, Laeven, and Valencia (2010) use U.S. commercial bank Call Reports to document a negative relationship
between the real interest rate and the riskiness of banks￿assets.
10For example, Dell￿ Ariccia, Laeven, and Marquez (2010) use a static model to show that an interest rate cut
increases bank risk taking.
11These papers augment the existing quantitative macro models with ￿nancial ampli￿cation mechanism ￿ la
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
6￿nancial intermediation and risk taking incentives, in environments in which banks choose equity
and deposits endogenously. Our work is similar to these two papers in that we build a quantita-
tive model in which intermediaries make endogenous portfolio choices. An important di⁄erence is
that we allow intermediaries to invest in safe bonds, which are later used as collateral in interbank
borrowing. This allows us to highlight the role of monetary policy in a⁄ecting risk taking through
the quantity of available collateral. We also complement the work in these papers by analyzing the
contribution of collateral assets with misperceived safety to risk taking.
Our paper is also related to the literature studying the impact of collateral constraints on the
macroeconomy. For example, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show that shocks to credit-constrained
￿rms are ampli￿ed and transmitted to output through changes in collateral values. Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2001) consider the impact of a shortage in domestic and international collateral
on real activity. While we do not consider valuation e⁄ects of interest rates on collateral, our paper
makes an important contribution by cautioning against attempts to relax the collateral constraint
of intermediaries. Relaxing this constraint results in increased risk taking in our model with adverse
e⁄ects for real activity.
While our main focus is on the relationship between monetary policy and risk taking, we
also introduce capital regulation in our model. We ￿nd that, in the presence of a time invariant
capital requirement, which mimics features of the current U.S. regulation, risk taking of ￿nancial
intermediaries is reduced, though at a welfare cost. Dubecq, Mojon, and Ragot (2009) also examine
the interaction between capital regulation and risk. They ￿nd that opaque capital regulation leads
to uncertainty about the risk exposure of ￿nancial intermediaries, a problem which is more severe
at low interest rates.
There is an extensive theoretical literature that examines other related aspects of ￿nancial
intermediation. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (2010), consider a model in which ￿nancial in-
termediaries alter capital allocation based on investor sentiment, and volatility of this sentiment
transmits to volatility in real activity. Stein (1998) examines the transmission mechanism of mon-
etary policy in a model in which banks￿portfolio choices respond to changes in the availability of
￿nancing via insured deposits. The main policy instrument in this paper is a reserve requirement
ratio. Diamond and Rajan (2009), Acharya and Naqvi (2010) and Agur and Demertzis (2010) ex-
amine the optimal policy when the monetary authority has a ￿nancial stability objective. Farhi
7and Tirole (2009) and Chari and Kehoe (2009) consider moral hazard consequences of government
bailouts.
3 Model Economy
This section outlines the environment we developed to better understand the connection between
interest rate policy and the risk taking behaviour of ￿nancial intermediaries.
The economy is populated by a measure one of identical households, a measure ￿m of identical
non￿nancial ￿rms, a measure 1 ￿ ￿m of ￿nancial intermediaries and a government. Financial
intermediaries are initially identical and later split into into high-risk or low-risk. Time is discrete
and in￿nite. Each period, the economy is subject to an exogenous aggregate shock which a⁄ects
the productivity of all ￿rms, as outlined in section 2:2. The aggregate state st 2 fs;sg follows a
￿rst-order Markov process. The history of aggregate shocks up to t is st:
A summary of the timing of events in our model is presented in Section A of the Appendix.
3.1 Households
At the beginning of period t; the aggregate state st is revealed and households receive returns
on their previous period investments, wage income and lump-sum taxes or transfers from the
government. Households split the resulting wealth, w
￿
st￿




investments that will pay returns in period t + 1.




, earn a ￿xed return, Rd ￿
st￿
, which is guaranteed by deposit insurance. Equity
invested in ￿nancial intermediaries, Z
￿
st￿
, is a risky investment which gives households a claim to
the pro￿ts of the intermediaries. The return per unit of equity is Rz ￿
st+1￿
. Similarly, the equity
investment into the non￿nancial sector, M
￿
st￿
, entitles the household to state contingent returns
next period, Rm ￿
st+1￿
.
Households supply labour inelastically. We assume that labour markets are segmented.12 Frac-
tion ￿m of a household￿ s time is spent working in the non￿nancial sector, and fraction 1 ￿ ￿m is
12The assumption of a labour market segmentation is done for convenience. Relaxing this assumption to allow
labour to move across ￿rms and sectors, would reinforce the risk taking channel present in our model, as both capital
and labour would ￿ ow in the same direction.
8spent in the ￿nancial sector. Wage rates vary by sector, the type of ￿rm within the sector and the
aggregate state of the economy: Wm
￿
st￿




is the wage rate paid by a ￿nancial intermediary of type j 2 fh;lg. Throughout,
h denotes high-risk and l denotes low-risk intermediaries. With these assumptions, labour supplied
to each ￿rm is normalized to one unit, for any realization of the aggregate state.
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where ￿ is the discount factor, ’
￿
st￿
is the probability of history st; ￿j with j 2 fh;lg is




lump-sum transfers if T
￿
st￿
￿ 0; or lump-sum taxes otherwise.
3.2 Firms
Financial and non￿nancial ￿rms di⁄er in the way they are funded, in the types of investments
they make and the productivity of these investments. Financial ￿rms ￿nance their operations
through household equity and deposits. The main di⁄erence between these two forms of funding
is that equity returns are contingent on the realization of the aggregate state in the period when
they are paid, while returns to deposits are not. In addition, equity returns are bounded below by
zero due to the limited liability of intermediaries, while deposit returns are guaranteed by deposit
insurance. Financial intermediaries invest into safe government bonds and risky projects. The latter
are investments into the production technologies of small ￿rms and can be of two types: high-risk
projects with productivity qh (st) and low-risk projects with productivity ql (st).13 Non￿nancial
13We assume that ￿nancial intermediaries operate the production technologies of small ￿rms directly. By not
modeling loans between intermediaries and these ￿rms, we abstract from information problems ￿ la Bernanke and
Gertler (1989). Also see footnote 5.
9￿rms are funded through household equity only.14 All equity raised is invested into capital whose
return depends on the productivity of the production technology in the non￿nancial sector, qm (st):
Note that, implicitly, households in our model invest directly into the risky production technology
of non￿nancial ￿rms. However, they need intermediaries to invest into the risky projects of small
￿rms.
We assume that high-risk ￿nancial intermediaries are more productive during a good aggregate
state (st = s), and less productive during a bad aggregate state (st = s), compared to low-risk
￿nancial intermediaries. Formally, qh (s) > ql (s) ￿ ql (s) > qh (s): Moreover, we consider that
the productivity of the production technology of non￿nancial ￿rms is such that: qh (s) ￿ qm (s) >
ql (s) ￿ ql (s) > qm (s) > qh (s): For details on the parameterization of these relative productivity
levels, see section 4.
3.2.1 Financial Sector
There is a measure 1￿￿m of ￿nancial intermediaries. The problem of an intermediary is to choose
a portfolio that maximizes the expected value of its equity. Initially, all ￿nancial intermediaries are
identical, they receive the same amount of deposits and equity from the households and make the
same investments into government bonds and risky projects. Financial intermediaries are subject
to capital regulation, which requires a minimum amount of equity for every unit of risky investment
as a bu⁄er for potential losses. Since our main focus is on optimal interest rate policy and risk
taking, we perform several experiments without binding capital regulation.
After the initial investment decisions, intermediaries acquire more information about the riski-
ness of their projects. With probability ￿j, the project an intermediary previously invested into is
of type j 2 fh;lg. We refer to intermediaries as being high-risk or low-risk intermediaries, based
on the type j of their risky projects. The probabilities, ￿h and ￿l = 1 ￿ ￿h, are time and state
invariant and known. Once j 2 fh;lg is known, but before the realization of st; intermediaries
trade bonds in the repo market in order to adjust the amount of resources invested into the risky
projects. Transactions in this market can be interpreted as bilateral repurchasing agreements and
are observable only by intermediaries. As a result, ￿nancial intermediaries may violate the capital
14The important assumption is that the non￿nancial sector is funded through state contingent claims. We use
equity for simplicity, but we could also allow for state contingent corporate bonds.
10regulation constraint. This is only revealed in case of bankruptcy.
We now describe the two stages of an intermediary￿ s problem that take place during period
t￿1. This shows how capital used for production in period t in the ￿nancial sector is determined.
Portfolio Choice in the Primary Market
After production in period t ￿ 1 has taken place, intermediaries receive resources from households
and make investment decisions that pay o⁄ in t. Financial intermediaries don￿ t know the type of
risky projects and maximize expected pro￿ts, taking as given future trades in the repo market.
Since households own all ￿rms in the economy, ￿rms value pro￿ts at history st according to the











Taking as given ￿
￿
st￿











, risky investments, k
￿
st￿1￿
, and labour, l
￿
st￿1￿




































> > > > <













































> > > > =












are pro￿ts for intermediary j 2 fh;lg at history st, p
￿
st￿1￿
is the primary market
bond price, ~ p
￿
st￿1￿
is the secondary market or repo market price, and ~ bj
￿
st￿1￿
is the amount of
bonds traded in the repo market by intermediary j:




















of resources invested in the risky projects and l
￿
st￿1￿
is the amount of labour employed. Recall
11that we abstract from labour redistribution and normalize l
￿
st￿1￿
to 1. Parameters ￿ and ￿ satisfy
￿;￿ 2 [0;1]; 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0. If ￿ > 0 there is a ￿xed factor present in the production process. In
the absence of bankruptcy, this factor￿ s returns are payable to the equity holders.
In equation (2); the undepreciated capital stock of ￿rms is adjusted by the productivity level.
This allows for variation in the value of capital, similar to Merton (1973) and Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010). The idea is that while capital may not depreciate in a physical sense during contraction
periods, it does so in an economic sense. In a case study of aerospace plants, Ramey and Shapiro
(2001) show that the decrease in the value of installed capital at plants that discontinued operations
is higher than the actual depreciation rate. In addition, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) provide
evidence that costs of capital reallocation are strongly countercyclical.
Lastly, ￿nancial intermediaries are subject to capital regulation, which requires the amount of
equity they hold per unit of risky investment to be larger than a constant ￿. This constraint￿ given
in (3)￿ captures some aspects of the Basel II accord.15
Portfolio Adjustments via Repo Market
Once intermediaries ￿nd out their type j 2 fh;lg, they adjust the riskiness of their portfolios by
trading bonds, ~ bj
￿
st￿1￿





























We assume that ~ bj
￿
st￿1￿
are not observed by the regulatory authority and, as a result, the
capital regulation constraint may not hold here. ~ bj
￿
st￿1￿
can be interpreted either as sales of
bonds or, alternatively, as repurchasing agreements.16 For this reason, we use the terms secondary
bond market and repo market interchangeably.
Empirically, collateralized repos are an important margin of balance sheet adjustment by inter-
mediaries and a good indicator of ￿nancial market risk, as shown by Adrian and Shin (2010) and
15There are other forms of regulation that are worthwhile contemplating in this model, including a state speci￿c
capital adequacy requirement. We leave this for future research.




as bond sales, incorporating explicitly the repurchase of bonds￿ which is typical in a
repo agreement￿ would yield identical results.
12Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2011). In our model, intermediaries can choose to collateralize
either a subset or all of their bonds in exchange for an equal amount of resources to be invested in
risky projects.17. That is, the intermediaries￿ability to increase their risky investment is limited
by their primary market activities. Higher purchases of bonds in the primary market make balance
sheets seem safer initially, but may lead to increased risk taking through the repo market.
3.3 Non￿nancial sector
There are ￿m identical non￿nancial ￿rms which are funded entirely through household equity. Each
non￿nancial ￿rm enters period t with equity M
￿
st￿1￿







: The problem of a non￿nancial ￿rm is to choose capital































We introduce this sector in order to bring our model closer to U.S. data. Speci￿cally, this allows
our model to be consistent with a high equity to deposit ratio observed for U.S. households, a low
equity to deposit ratio in the U.S. ￿nancial sector and the relative importance of the two sectors
in U.S. production. Moreover, a large non￿nancial sector￿ as observed in U.S. data￿ reduces the
quantitative importance of the ￿nancial intermediation sector for welfare and risk taking in our
model. Excluding it, would overstate the impact of policy on our results.
3.4 Government
The government issues bonds that ￿nancial intermediaries can use either as an asset or as a medium







. These bonds pay o⁄ during period t. Part of the proceeds from the bond sales
is used to cover a proportional cost, ￿, of issuing bonds, while the remainder is deposited into
17In comparison, a repo transaction in the data may require the borrower to pledge collateral in excess of the loan
received. See, for example, Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2011). Requiring excess collateral in our model would
reduce borrowing via the repo market and would make our results stronger.
13￿nancial intermediaries.18 Each ￿nancial intermediary receives Dg
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To guarantee the ￿xed return on deposits the government provides deposit insurance at zero
price which is ￿nanced through household taxation.19 The government balances its budget after



















is the amount of deposit insurance necessary to guarantee the ￿xed return on
deposits, Rd ￿
st￿1￿
. Given the limited liability of intermediaries, if they are unable to pay Rd ￿
st￿1￿
on deposits, they pay a smaller return on deposits which ensures they break-even. The rest is
covered by the deposit insurance.




The government satis￿es any demand for bonds given this price. The key decision from the govern-
ment￿ s perspective is to choose the bond price p
￿
st￿1￿
that maximizes the welfare of the households
in the decentralized economy.
3.5 Market clearing
There are eight market clearing conditions. The labour market clearing conditions state that labour









18Alternatively, the proceeds from the bond sales could be handed to the households via transfers. Our results
would be una⁄ected by such a change.
19The assumption of a zero price of deposit insurance is not important for our purpose. What matters is that the
insurance is not priced in a way that eliminates moral hazard. This means, for example, that the deposit insurance
can not be made contingent on the portfolio decisions of the intermediaries due to lack of observability repo market
transactions.
20We concentrate on new issuance of bonds only and abstract from outstanding bonds for computational reasons.
Considering the valuation e⁄ects of current policy in the presence of outstanding bonds might be an interesting
extension of the model.
14The goods market clearing condition equates total output produced with aggregate consumption
















































Financial markets clearing conditions ensure that the deposit markets, equity markets and bond














































3.6 Social Planner Problem
We consider the following social planner￿ s problem as a reference point for our decentralized econ-
omy. For ease of comparison between the two environments, we refer to the existence of ￿nancial
15and non￿nancial sectors even in the context of the social planner￿ s problem. At the beginning of
period t; the aggregate state, st, is revealed and production takes place using capital that the social
planner has allocated to the di⁄erent technologies of production: km
￿
st￿1￿











, is then split between consumption and capital to be used in production at
t+1. At the time of this decision, the social planner does not distinguish between the high-risk and




, to both of them. Once their type is revealed, the social planner can reallocate
resources between the two technologies, at a cost.
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represents the resources reallocated between the two technologies















is an indicator function
which allows for costly reallocation either from the high-risk to the low-risk technology, or vice-
versa.
3.7 Competitive Equilibrium Properties
In this section, we discuss equilibrium properties of our model and present results on the relationship
between equilibrium bond prices and the return to deposits. In addition, we de￿ne what we mean by
16risk taking behavior of ￿nancial intermediaries and provide intuition for how interest rate changes
a⁄ect risk taking.
3.7.1 Constrained and Unconstrained Equilibria
Our model has several key features, such as the limited liability of ￿nancial intermediaries and the
presence of the repo market, which allow for bankruptcy to occur in equilibrium, and facilitate
changes in portfolio risks.
Financial intermediaries maximize expected returns to equity, but bene￿t from limited liability.
When a bad productivity shock occurs, intermediaries who are unable to pay the promised rate
of return to depositors declare bankruptcy. Equity holders receive no return on their investments,
while the returns to depositors are covered by deposit insurance. Limited liability introduces an
asymmetry in that it allows the high-risk intermediary to make investment decisions that bring large
pro￿ts in good times, while being shielded from losses in bad times. In our numerical experiments,
only the high-risk intermediaries go bankrupt.
The redistribution of resources that takes place through the repo market allows ￿nancial inter-
mediaries to change their risk exposure in light of new information obtained about their investments.
Intermediaries who use bonds as collateral in the repo market increase the amount of resources allo-
cated to risky investments. By the same token, intermediaries who give resources against collateral
decrease their risk exposure. From a social planner￿ s perspective, it is optimal for resources to ￿ ow
to high-risk intermediaries during expansion periods and to low-risk intermediaries during contrac-
tions. To induce these reallocation ￿ ows in the competitive equilibrium, bond prices need to be
appropriately chosen by the monetary authority. They should be relatively low in good times and
high in bad times, so that returns to safe bonds are high in good times and low in bad times. Here
is a brief intuition for these results. Overall, returns to bonds are linked to expected returns to
equity through non-arbitrage conditions. In addition, bond returns in a contraction need to be low
in absolute terms, so that the return to deposits is low (recall the results on prices in Proposition
1). If the return to deposits were too high, then high-risk intermediaries would not be able to repay
the depositors in a bad state. As a result, the high-risk intermediaries would prefer to take on more
risk in the repo market, in contrast to the social planner￿ s solution.
For a given monetary policy, p
￿
st￿
, multiple equilibria exist. A common situation is the coexis-
17tence of an equilibrium with positive government bond holdings and one with zero bond holdings.
We focus our analysis on the former, since trading in the repo market is always desirable given
a su¢ ciently low cost of issuing bonds. Furthermore, equilibria can be of two types. When ￿-







, we refer to equilibria as having an unconstrained repo market. Equilibria with
a constrained repo market are ones in which either high-risk or low-risk intermediaries pledge all
their bond holdings as collateral. When the interest rate policy is chosen optimally, the equilibrium
has a constrained repo market. The intuition is that optimal policy aims to restrict risk taking
of high-risk ￿nancial intermediaries, who otherwise may take advantage of their limit liability and
overinvest in risky projects. An e⁄ective way to restrict risk taking and potential bankruptcy is to
limit the amount of bonds, so that collateral for future trading in the repo market is scarce.
Due to the limited liability of ￿nancial intermediaries and the possibility of a constrained repo
market, we need to employ non-linear techniques to solve our model. We use a collocation method
with occasionally binding non-linear constraints.
3.7.2 Bond Prices and the Return to Deposits
Proposition 1 Consider an economy with positive government bond holdings. In the absence of










p(st￿1). The last inequality is strict in the case
of a constrained repo market. Moreover, in an equilibrium with binding capital regulation, bond










Proof. These results follow from the ￿rst order conditions of the ￿nancial intermediaries￿problems.
Appendix B outlines the proof.
The intuition for these results is as follows. In the absence of capital regulation, there are no
frictions in the model that would make primary and secondary bond prices di⁄erent. When capital
regulation binds, intermediaries are required to hold a minimum share of safe assets, and they are
only willing to acquire additional bonds in the repo market if the price is lower than in the primary
market. In addition, returns to deposits are weakly greater than returns to bonds, since otherwise
there would be a pro￿t opportunity for an intermediary willing to pay a bit more to its depositors.
18Proposition (1) is important for two reasons. First, it shows that as long as capital regulation
does not constrain the choices ￿nancial intermediaries make, interest rate policy has a direct e⁄ect
on the repo market. Second, the return to depositors is bounded below by the implicit interest rate
of government bonds. Thus, the interest rate policy not only a⁄ects the choices ￿nancial interme-
diaries make, but also a⁄ects the investment choices of households. In quantitative experiments,
we ￿nd the latter e⁄ect to be weaker than the former.
3.7.3 Risk Taking: Measurement and Impact of Policy
We use our model to assess whether and how monetary policy in￿ uences risk taking of intermedi-
aries. To this end, we make the notion of risk taking precise. We de￿ne risk taking as the percentage

















where superscripts fCE;SPg denote whether the variable is part of the solution to the com-

















is the capital that the social planner invests in the











is the capital invested
in the high-risk projects in the competitive equilibrium.
A positive value of r
￿
st￿1￿
in equation (5) tells us that there is excessive risk taking in the
competitive equilibrium, while a negative value indicates too little risk taking. In numerical results,
we plot the cyclical behaviour of risk taking, but also report an aggregate measure de￿ned as an






In what follows, we provide some intuition on how interest rate changes a⁄ect risk taking during
an expansion or a contraction. For illustration purposes, we consider a static, partial equilibrium
setting of the ￿nancial intermediation sector in our model. The bond prices are exogenously ￿xed
and the aggregate shock is either high (s) or low (s): We examine the portfolio choices of interme-
diaries in the primary market and the repo market.
When the economy is in an expansion, resources are optimally redistributed from the low-risk
intermediary to the more productive high-risk intermediary. Figure 1 illustrates the impact that
19lower returns to safe bonds have on investments in risky projects. Purchases of bonds in the primary
market are negatively related to bond returns, which means that all intermediaries invest more
capital into risky projects at low interest rates. Then, in an expansion, high-risk intermediaries use
the repo market to lower their holdings of bonds and invest extra resources in their risky projects
(as illustrated by the fact that the dotted line is below the solid line). In Figure 1, the squares to
the right of the kink on the dotted line mark equilibria in which the high-risk intermediaries are
unconstrained in the repo market. In these equilibria, they collateralize only a subset of their bond
holdings in order to borrow on the repo market. Then, as the return to bonds decreases￿ say, from
1:08 to 1:06 in the ￿gure￿ high-risk intermediaries allocate more resources to risky projects. While
the following result is not visible from our illustration, we note that, in our full model, such an
increase in high-risk investments exceeds the social optimum. Hence, risk taking goes up as safe
returns decline, whenever intermediaries are unconstrained in their repo activities.
In addition, in an expansion, intermediaries may be constrained in their repo market transac-
tions, if they purchased few bonds in the primary market. In Figure 1, constrained equilibria are
marked by the squares to the left of the kink on the dotted line. In this example, if the return
to bonds decreases￿ say from 1:03 to 1:02 in the ￿gure￿ reallocation between intermediaries is
restricted due to scarce collateral. In the full model, this leads to a reduction in risk taking relative
to the social optimum.
In contrast, when the economy is in a contraction, resources are optimally distributed from
the high-risk intermediary to the low-risk intermediary. As before, lower rates on safe assets push
more capital into risky projects in the primary market. In the repo market, in an unconstrained
equilibrium, the low-risk intermediaries receive extra resources and risk taking reduces. However, in
a constrained repo market equilibrium, due to fewer bond purchases in the primary market, there is
limited retrading and less resources are given from the high-risk to the low-risk intermediary, thus
increasing risk taking.
Empirically, expansion periods are longer than contractions. Our calibrated model is consistent
with this fact. This means that, in our benchmark model with a constrained repo market, lowering
interest rates leads to less risk taking, on average, relative to the social planner problem. The
opposite is true in our benchmark model with an unconstrained repo market.
204 Calibration
This section outlines our approach for determining the various parameters of the model and de-
scribes the data we use. We calibrate the following parameters: ￿;￿;￿; the aggregate shock tran-
sition matrix ￿, and ￿h. We determine ￿m; ￿; ￿; qh (s); qh (s); qm (s); qm (s); ql (s); ql (s) using
a minimum distance estimator. All parameter values are summarized in Tables 1 and 2.
The utility discount factor, ￿, is calibrated to ensure an annual real interest rate of 4% in our
quarterly model. We obtain ￿ = 0:99. The capital income share is determined using data from the
U.S. National Income and Product Account (NIPA) provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) for the period 1947 to 2009. We ￿nd ￿ = 0:29 for the business sector.21 The cost of issuing
government bonds, ￿, is determined from existing literature. Stigum (1983, 1990) reports brokerage
fees for U.S. Treasury bills between 0:0013% and 0:008% of the amount issued. Green (2004) reports
fees around 0:004%. A higher cost of issuing bonds has negative consequences in our paper, since
it reduces welfare and it makes the use of bonds as a medium of exchange less desirable. To stress
the robustness of our results, we choose the highest estimate, ￿ = 0:008%.
To calibrate the transition matrix for the aggregate state of the economy, we use the Harding
and Pagan (2002) approach of identifying peaks and troughs in the real value added of the U.S.
business sector, from 1947Q1 to 2010Q2.22 We ￿nd 11 contractions with an average duration of
5 quarters. Hence, the probability of switching from a bad realization of the aggregate shock at
time t￿1 to a good realization at time t is ￿(st = sjst￿1 = s) = 0:20: Moreover, the probability of
switching from an expansion period to a contraction is ￿(st = sjst￿1 = s) = 0:0553: The calibrated
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A parameter which is challenging to determine is the fraction of ￿nancial intermediaries who
fund high-risk projects, ￿h. In our benchmark calibration, we set ￿h = 15% and ￿l = 1￿￿h = 85%.
To obtain this estimate, we assume that brokers and dealers are the high-risk intermediaries in
the U.S. and we measure the average share of their ￿nancial assets relative to other ￿nancial
21For the corporate business sector￿ where income is split into capital and labor by the BEA￿ we ￿nd ￿ = 0:29: For
noncorporate businesses which include proprietors, we need to split proprietor￿ s income into capital and labor income
in order to compute the capital income share. We attribute 0:788 percent of proprietor￿ s income to labor income and
￿nd a capital share for the noncorporate sector of 0:29. While 0:788 might seem high, it is not unreasonable.
22The business cycles we identify closely mimic those determined by the NBER.
21intermediaries.23 We perform sensitivity analysis with respect to ￿h.
Next, we determine the following 9 parameters: the importance of the non￿nancial sector,
￿m, the ￿xed factor in the production function of the ￿nancial sector, ￿, the depreciation rate,
￿, and the productivity parameters, qh (s); qh (s); qm (s); qm (s); ql (s); ql (s). The absolute level
of productivity is not important in our model. As a result, we normalize the productivity of the
high-risk intermediary in the good aggregate state, qh (s) = 1. We estimate the remaining eight
parameters using eight data moments described below. Unless otherwise noted, we use quarterly
data from 1987Q1 to 2010Q2: We focus on this time period because U.S. in￿ ation was low and
stable.
1. The ￿rst moment we target in our estimation procedure is the share of output produced by
the non￿nancial sector. This pins down the value of ￿m in our model. We identify our model￿ s
total output with the U.S. business sector value added published by the BEA. In addition, we
identify the non￿nancial sector in our model with the U.S. corporate non￿nancial sector.24 We aim
to match the average value added share of the corporate non￿nancial sector of 66:9% observed in
the U.S. since 1987.
2. The parameter ￿ in￿ uences the returns to equity in our model￿ s ￿nancial sector, which, in
turn, depend on the equity to total assets ratio of the intermediaries. We use the equity to asset
ratio for corporate ￿nancial businesses as a second data moment to target in our estimation. Using
data from the U.S. Flow of Funds from 1994Q1 to 2010Q2; we ￿nd this ratio to be on average 7:6%.
In performing this calculation, we exclude mutual funds.25 We choose the time period beginning
in 1994; because the Basel I capital regulation had been implemented by then.
23While the assumption that brokers and dealers are high-risk intermediaries seems reasonable, the widespread use
of o⁄-balance sheet activities among other institutions suggests that this de￿nition may be too narrow.
Using Flow of Funds data for the U.S. from 2000 to 2007, we ￿nd that ￿nancial assets of brokers and dealers
were, on average, 4% of the ￿nancial assets of all ￿nancial institutions and 20% of the ￿nancial assets of depository
institutions. We chose a benchmark value of ￿h in between these two estimates. We note that the 20% average masks
a large variation, from 18% in early 2000s to 28% in the eve of the recent crisis.
24Note that we treat the remainder of the U.S. business sector, namely the corporate ￿nancial businesses and the
noncorporate businesses, as the model￿ s ￿nancial intermediation sector. In U.S. data, noncorporate businesses are
strongly dependent on the ￿nancial sector for funding. In the past three decades, bank loans and mortgages were 60
to 80 percent of noncorporate businesses￿liabilities. For simplicity, we do not model these loans, but rather assume
that the ￿nancial intermediary is endowed with the technology of production of noncorporate businesses.
25The equity to asset ratio of depository institutions only￿ commercial banks, savings institutions and credit
unions￿ is essentially identical to the ratio computed for the corporate ￿nancial sector excluding mutual funds.
223. In our model, the depreciation rate is stochastic and is given by:
￿mqm;t￿km;t + (1 ￿ ￿m)(￿hqh;t￿kh;t + ￿lql;t￿kl;t)
￿mkm;t + (1 ￿ ￿m)(￿hkh;t + ￿lkl;t)
We determine the value of ￿ to ensure that the average depreciation rate in the model matches the
data, namely 2:5% per quarter.
4. We target the maximum decline in real output in the business sector, averaged across all
contraction periods since 1947. We detrend output by a constant growth trend to make it stationary.
Then, using the turning points approach in Harding and Pagan (2002), we ￿nd the average decline
in output to be 6:48%.
5. We aim to match a coe¢ cient of variation for the U.S. business sector output of 3.75%. We
calculate this statistic after removing a linear trend from the logarithm of output.
6. We target a coe¢ cient of variation for U.S. household net worth of 8.17%. To obtain this
statistics, we use U.S. Flow of Funds data and detrend the logarithm of household net worth using





7. We aim to match a ratio of household deposits to total ￿nancial assets of 17:2%, as observed
in U.S. Flow of Funds data.
8. Finally, we aim to match the recovery rate during bankruptcy. We use an estimate pro-
vided by Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2003), which states that, the average recovery rate on
corporate bonds in the United States during 1982 to 1999 was 42 cents on the dollar.
We determine all eight parameters jointly using a minimum distance estimator to match the
target moments above. Let ￿i be a model moment and ~ ￿i be the corresponding data moment.
Our procedure makes use of the problems given in (6) and (7) below. Notice that in (6) we impose
restrictions on the ordering of productivity parameters across the di⁄erent technology types. For
23our benchmark calibration, we are abstracting from capital adequacy requirement and set ￿ = 0.
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is part of a competitive equilibrium given Q￿
We start out with a guess Q￿
1 and solve the problem in (7) for an optimal policy p￿. Next,
we take this optimal policy as given and choose parameters to minimize the distance between
our model moments and the corresponding data moments, as shown in (6). This step yields Q￿
2.
We continue the procedure till convergence is achieved. The reason for choosing this two-step
procedure is because our model is highly nonlinear and the initial guess is very important in ￿nding
a competitive equilibrium solution. The guess we start with is the social planner￿ s solution.
The estimated parameters are presented in Tables 2. Notice that despite the assumption that
depreciation is stochastic, the model is able to perfectly match the average depreciation observed in
the data. Table 3 shows that the model matches the targeted data moments well. Some moments￿
such as the capital depreciation rate, or the coe¢ cient of variation of output￿ are matched very well,
while others￿ the recovery rate after bankruptcy, or the deposits to asset ratio for households￿ are
still a bit far from the data. Regarding the recovery rate in bankruptcy, one aspect to keep in mind
is that the data target taken from Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2003) was for corporate bonds
only, while the model considers recovery rates for small business bankruptcies. In addition, there
is a tight relationship between the model￿ s recovery rate, deposit and equity ratios. The reason
for the low recovery rate is a low equity to asset ratio of ￿nancial intermediaries and a very strong
decline of output during contractions. Given a low recovery rate in bankruptcy, households desire
safe assets and choose to hold a high proportion of their wealth in deposits.
245 Results
First, we present results from our benchmark model. Then, we consider a version of our model that
allows for issuance of private misrated bonds, and for foreign demand for these bonds. The latter
experiment is meant to shed light on some aspects of the recent ￿nancial crisis.
5.1 Risk Taking and Welfare in the Benchmark Model
We present most of the results from the competitive equilibrium by contrasting them with the
optimal social planner solution. Our ￿rst ￿nding is that the social planner allocation cannot be
implemented as a competitive equilibrium.
We aim to ￿nd prices, including the interest rate policy, that would implement the social planner
allocation as a competitive equilibrium in our model with ￿nancial and non￿nancial sectors. This
would require that, in a bad aggregate state, the returns to deposits and bonds satisfy: Rd < 1=p;
which violates the competitive equilibrium result derived in Proposition 1. The intuition for our
￿nding is as follows. In a bad aggregate state, it is optimal to shift resources from high-risk
to low-risk intermediaries, which are now relatively more productive. Implementing the social
planner optimal allocation has two implications for competitive equilibrium prices. First, high-risk
intermediaries would need to buy a large value of bonds in the repo market, so as to shift their
portfolio away from their risky projects. To provide these incentives, bond returns need to be
su¢ ciently high implying that bond prices need to be su¢ ciently low in a bad aggregate state.
Second, to insure no bankruptcy in equilibrium, returns to deposits need to be relatively low. In
combination, prices would have to satisfy Rd < 1=p, which contradicts Proposition 1. Therefore, the
social planner allocation cannot be implemented, since the moral hazard problem of the high-risk
￿nancial intermediaries is so severe, that interest rate policy alone cannot resolve it.
Given that the social planner allocation is not implementable, we ￿nd the optimal bond price,
p￿ ￿
st￿1￿
, that maximizes the unconditional welfare of the representative consumer. We solve (P3)














subject to: ~ C
￿
st￿
is part of a competitive equilibrium given policy p
￿
st￿1￿
We use two metrics to compare competitive equilibrium results to the social planner allocation.
First, we use the risk taking measure de￿ned in Section 3.7.3 to determine whether a particular
interest rate policy implies too much or too little risk taking relative to the social planner. In
addition, we consider a standard welfare measure. We de￿ne the lifetime consumption equivalent
(LTCE) as the percentage decrease in the optimal consumption from the social planner allocation
required to give the consumer the same welfare as the consumption from the competitive equilibrium
with a given interest rate policy.
We conduct four experiments and report welfare and risk taking results from 5000-quarter
simulations in Table 4. Unless otherwise noted, we abstract from capital regulation, i.e. we set
￿ = 0 in equation (3).
Experiment 1: Equilibrium without repo market reallocation. We consider the solution
to our benchmark economy when the monetary authority sets a very high primary market bond
price. This leads to no purchases of bonds, and, as a result, intermediaries cannot adjust their
portfolios in the repo market. The shutdown of the repo market leads to a substantial welfare loss,
namely 0:88% in LTCE (see Table 4). Put di⁄erently, each time period, the competitive equilibrium
consumption is 0:88% lower relative to the social planner. One of the reasons for the welfare loss is
the excessive risk taking observed in the competitive equilibrium due to a suboptimal allocation of
resources across ￿nancial intermediaries. Reallocation of resources via the repo market is optimal
and would bring the economy closer to the social planner allocation.
Experiment 2: Optimal interest rate policy,
￿
p￿ ￿
st￿1￿￿￿1 : Next, we optimize over the
policy function in our benchmark economy. We ￿nd that at the optimal policy the welfare is very
close to the social planner. There is less reallocation compared to what the social planner chooses,
and this entails of small welfare loss of 0:04% in LTCE. Yet, even for the best interest rate policy,
26the risk taking is elevated exceeding the one found in the planner￿ s problem by 23:6%.
Figure 2 presents simulation results for our benchmark model and comparisons to the allocation
from the planner￿ s problem. We plot results for a sequence of one hundred random draws of the
aggregate shock. As seen in the two bottom subplots, the excessive risk taking in the competitive
equilibrium is mainly due to periods with good realizations of the aggregate state, when resources
in the repo market are reallocated from the low-risk to the high-risk projects. Risk taking in
contractions is lower than in expansions, but still in excess of the social planner optimum.
Another important insight from experiment 2 is that, at the optimal interest rate policy, gov-
ernment transfers to households are positive, on average, due to net revenues from issuing bonds.
This is true despite the fact that the government provides deposit insurance at no cost, and it needs
to tax households to guarantee deposit returns when the high-risk intermediaries become bankrupt.
Experiment 3: Level shifts in the optimal interest rate policy. We consider uniform
upward or downward shifts in interest rates relative to those under the optimal policy. Namely,
the schedules of bond returns we consider are:
￿
p￿ ￿
st￿1￿￿￿1 ￿  , where p￿ (￿) is the optimal bond
price and   is a constant, say 0:1 percentage points. We compute the benchmark model￿ s results
under these alternate policies.
We examine the extend to which lower than optimal interest rates contribute to increased risk
taking of ￿nancial intermediaries and to lower welfare. Figure 3 shows our results for a wide
range of values of  : In both subplots, the x-axis gives deviations from the optimal policy in the
competitive equilibrium in percentage points at annual rates. The optimal policy is at the zero
mark on the x-axis. We ￿nd that small deviations from the optimal policy, say 50 basis points,
entails relatively small welfare losses, but sizable changes in risk taking. Notice that, in both ￿gures,
the lines have a kink. On the left side of the kink, the economies with the speci￿ed policies display
a constrained repo market in which either the high-risk or the low-risk intermediaries pledge all
bonds as collateral. To the right of the kink, we have economies with unconstrained repo market
equilibria.
As conjectured in Section 3.7, the equilibrium with optimal interest rate policy (the square dots
in Figure 3) features a constraint secondary market. In proximity to the optimum, an increase in
bond returns leads to more risk taking and a decrease in bond returns leads to less risk taking.
27Notice that when the repo market becomes unconstrained the relationship between variations in
bond returns and risk taking changes sign (see bottom panel of Figure 3).




￿￿￿1 : Finally, we consider the impact of a capital requirement constraint, as given by
equation (3). We choose ￿ = 8%, which is the current level implemented in the United States
in accordance with Basel II, and reoptimize the interest rate policy. We ￿nd that risk taking
decreases substantially, from 23:6% in our benchmark model without regulation (experiment 2) to




, welfare is comparable to the one in experiment 2. We note that, while capital
regulation is successful in reducing risk taking, changes in policy in the presence of regulation are
more costly in welfare terms. For example, small upward deviations from the optimal policy can
lead to huge welfare losses in the order of 1% LTCE.
Implications of Variation in the Share of High-Risk Intermediaries Up to now, we
reported experiments for ￿h = 0:15. Next, we report some of the main implications of our model
for a smaller and a larger fraction of high-risk intermediaries, ￿h 2 f0:13;0:17g. The results from
this sensitivity analysis are reported in Table 5. While the quantitative results change, we ￿nd that
the qualitative results remain intact.
A ￿rst interesting result is that potential welfare gains from having a repo market are increas-
ing with the share of high-risk intermediaries. This result is quite intuitive since the gains from
reallocation arise due to the presence of high-risk intermediaries. A larger fraction of high-risk
intermediaries increases the bene￿ts of resource reallocation as the economic state varies.
Focusing on the results concerning the respective second best policy, we ￿nd that welfare losses
and risk taking under the second best policy are relatively insensitive to a variation in ￿h: Also the
relationship between ￿h and the amount of risk taking is non-linear.
Regarding variations of the interest rate around the second best, we ￿nd that lower rates lead
to less risk taking regardless of the value of ￿h and that indeed for the lowest considered value of
￿h an upward deviation in the policy rate can become quite costly (￿0:44% LTCE), relative to a
downward deviation of similar magnitude (￿0:0536% LTCE).
285.2 Model with Rating Agencies, Private Bonds and Foreign Investment
In this section, we modify the benchmark model to allow for some features that were prominent in
the run-up to the late 2000s crisis. Our goal is to shed light on how these features, in interaction
with the interest rate policy, a⁄ect risk taking of intermediaries.
In our augmented model, ￿nancial intermediaries can issue private bonds during an expansion
period, and sell these bonds to other ￿nancial intermediaries, or to foreign investors. In addition,
credit rating agencies "stamp" the private bonds as being safe, in exchange for a cost which is
proportional to the value of the bonds.26 Once stamped, private bonds appear to be as safe as
government bonds and are traded at the same bond price ~ p.27 During an expansion, the private
bonds are fully repaid every period by their issuers. However, when a bad aggregate state realizes,
the high-risk ￿nancial intermediaries default on their private bonds. In this case, the government
bails out domestic bond holders by fully guaranteeing their returns on the stamped private bonds.
This public guarantee justi￿es our assumption that domestic bond purchasers are indi⁄erent be-
tween government and private bonds. In contrast, foreign investors are surprised to learn that
their allegedly safe bonds return only 90 percent of what was due. Thus, we assume that the
rating agencies give foreigners the erroneous impression that the returns to private bonds are safe.
The foreign investors are forced to take a 10 percent haircut on their bond values. In numerical
experiments, we vary the size of the haircut and ￿nd that our risk taking results are robust.
We introduce these new features into our benchmark model, since they are believed to be at
the root of the late-2000s ￿nancial crisis. It has been often argued that, credit rating agencies
contributed to the propagation of asset mispricing by giving top ratings to derivative securities,
which should have been assigned to a much riskier category. Moreover, the demand for top rated
assets from domestic pension funds and foreign wealth funds was fueling the incentive to overlook
risks and devise complex derivative securities, which would appear to be much safer than their
underlying assets. For background, see Taylor (2009), Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2011)
and Hoerdahl and King (2008).
In our extension, foreign demand for domestic bonds contributes to relaxing the collateral
26Relative to the benchmark model, the only crucial assumption is the presence of rating agencies that misrepresent
the riskiness of private bonds.
27We could instead allow for some yield spread between the returns to private and government bonds. A ￿xed
spread is not going to change our qualitative results. An endogenous risk spread is beyond the scope of this paper.
29constraints faced by ￿nancial intermediaries.28 Speci￿cally, we assume that in any given period
during an expansion phase, when ￿nancial intermediaries buy government bonds, they are not
completely sure whether foreign investors will be willing to buy domestic private bonds. In the
model, the existence or absence of foreign demand is revealed after domestic intermediaries trade
government bonds among themselves in the domestic repo market. At this point, with probability
￿F the foreigners are willing to buy domestic private bonds, in which case ￿nancial intermediaries
who want to borrow more capital issue their own bonds, in the amount aj for j 2 fh;lg: Before
they can sell these bonds, however, they must receive the approval stamp from the rating agencies.
This stamp is given at the real cost of ￿aj (￿ = 0:01), which is due after the production takes place.
Once the bonds are stamped, they can be sold at the same price as the government bonds, ~ p:
Alternatively, with probability (1 ￿ ￿F) the foreigners do not want to buy domestic bonds, in
which case there are no private bonds issued and, at least some intermediaries, are constrained in
their repo market bond sales. If the probability (1 ￿ ￿F) is large enough, the intermediaries still
want to buy government bonds from the primary bond market, to facilitate their repo transactions.
In the simulations, we set ￿F at 0:1 percent. Lastly, the government uses lump-sum taxes on
the households to guarantee full returns to domestic private bond holders and partial returns to
foreigners in case of a bad shock.
Implications of our model with rating agencies
We consider a 5000-period simulation of our model extension. Figure 4 plots 100 periods from
that simulation. During every expansion period foreign demand is positive, allowing ￿nancial
intermediaries to relax their collateral constraint. As a result, we ￿nd higher levels of excessive risk
in comparison to the benchmark economy simulation, shown in Figure 2.
We also report results from simulations that have 24 quarters of expansion and 6 quarters of
contraction, similar to the U.S. business cycle dated by the NBER to have lasted from November
2001 to June 2009. We consider the very low likelihood event that, foreign demand is positive
in every period of the expansion phase. These results are not thought of as representing a regu-
lar functioning ￿nancial market, but are meant to capture extreme circumstances, such as those
recently experienced in the United States. Our results are shown in Figure 5:
28Using Flow of Funds data, it can be shown that the rest of the world holds a signi￿cant portion of US securities:
Treasury and agency backed securities, commercial paper and corporate bonds.
30The red dashed curve in the top panel of Figure 5 shows how welfare losses over the simulated
business cycle vary with uniform shifts away from the optimal interest rate policy in the benchmark
model. The welfare losses are measured in consumption equivalent units relative to the social opti-
mum simulated over the same 30 quarter cycle. In particular, we measure the percentage decrease
in the optimal consumption from the social planner allocation necessary to give the consumer the
same welfare as in the competitive equilibrium with private bonds and rating agencies.
Figure 5 also shows welfare losses from our benchmark model (without mispriced bonds) over the
same 30 quarter cycle.29 We ￿nd that, in the presence of erroneous ratings of bonds, welfare losses
are much larger than before. Equivalently, the welfare costs of relaxing the collateral constraint of
intermediaries are quite large. We conclude that the collateral channel in our benchmark model is
an important tool for restricting risk taking of ￿nancial intermediaries.
The bottom panel of Figure 5 shows the risk taking implications of interest rate variations in
our benchmark model and the extension. The di⁄erence is remarkable. With erroneous ratings
of bonds, lower policy rates unambiguously increase risk taking. The high-risk intermediaries are
no longer constrained in their risk taking, even if they buy few government bonds in the primary
market. In our model extension, the costs associated with excessive risk taking are borne by foreign
investors and the government.
Our results suggest that lower than optimal policy rates can indeed contribute to more risk
taking, provided there are some other sources of ine¢ ciency in ￿nancial markets, which lead par-
ticipants to misprice risk.30
6 Conclusion
The recent ￿nancial crisis has stirred interest in the relationship between lower than optimal interest
rates and the risk taking behavior of ￿nancial institutions. We examine this relationship in a
dynamic general equilibrium model that features deposit insurance, limited liability of ￿nancial
intermediaries, as well as heterogeneity in the riskiness of intermediaries￿portfolios.
29As seen in the ￿gure, depending on the interest rate policy, the 30-quarter cycle simulation of our benchmark
economy may give higher welfare relative to the social planner. This is due to the fact that the simulated cycle has
a very long expansion phase during which intermediaries in the competitive equilibrium invest lots of resources in
productive risky projects.
30A binding capital adequacy requirement does not change these results, since this constraint mainly a⁄ects the
balance sheet in the primary market.
31There are two channels through which interest rate policy in￿ uences risk taking in our model.
The portfolio channel illustrates the idea that lower than optimal policy rates reduce the returns to
safe assets and lead intermediaries to shift investments towards riskier assets. In turn, given fewer
bond purchases in the primary market, intermediaries have less collateral available for repo market
transactions. Hence, the collateral channel constrains the ability of intermediaries to take on more
risk through the repo market, after they receive further information regarding the riskiness of their
projects. We calibrate our model to U.S. data, and show that, our decentralized economy with
optimal interest rate policy has welfare that is very close, though below, the social optimum and
features excessive risk taking. While both risk taking channels lead to important changes in the
intermediaries￿portfolios, we ￿nd that, for small variations around the optimal policy, the collateral
channel dominates quantitatively. Thus, lower than optimal interest rates lead to less risk taking.
We also consider the implications of allowing for issuance of private bonds by intermediaries,
which are misrepresented as being safe by rating agencies. In this version of the model, we ￿nd
higher levels of excessive risk taking, and substantial welfare losses at low interest rates.
There are di⁄erent potential extensions to our work. First, our paper focuses on a time con-
sistent interest rate policy. It may be worthwhile to evaluate the consequences of a departure
from this assumption. In addition, while we consider the implications of state independent capital
requirements, we do not aim to characterize the features of an optimal capital regulation. The
capital regulation in our model is successful in reducing risk taking, but also reduces welfare. A
more ￿ exible regulation has potential to reduce risk taking in the economy, while delivering higher
welfare relative to an equilibrium with optimal interest rate policy alone. Thus, it seems worthwhile
to consider the joint determination of optimal capital regulation and optimal interest rate policy.
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36A Timing of Model Events
Let st 2 fs;sg be the aggregate shock at time t: Let st = (s1;s2;:::st) be the history of the aggregate




: The timing of the economy is as follows.




























￿ At the beginning of period t; the aggregate shock st realizes and ￿nancial and non￿nancial
￿rms ￿nd out their current productivity shocks: qj (st) for intermediaries of type j 2 fh;lg
and qm (st) for non￿nancial ￿rms. All ￿rms produce output using the capital that has been
allocated to production at the end of period t ￿ 1:












￿ Financial intermediaries pay state contingent returns to labour and may declare bankruptcy,






are liquidated. Their equity holders receive no equity returns and the government steps in to
guarantee the rate of return on deposits.
￿ The government uses lump-sum taxes or transfers T
￿
st￿
to cover expenses and to balance its
budget.
￿ Household wealth, w
￿
st￿
, is realized. Households use current wealth to purchase consumption










labour inelastically to ￿nancial intermediaries and non￿nancial ￿rms.











￿ At the end of period t; ￿nancial intermediaries allocate the resources received from household
into bonds and risky projects. Subsequently, they ￿nd out the type of risky project j 2 fh;lg
they invested in and trade repurchasing agreements on government bonds in the secondary
bond market. The resulting investments into the risky projects pay returns at the beginning
of period t + 1, after shock st+1 realizes.
37B Sketch of Proof for Proposition 1
To simplify notation in our derivations, we use subscripts as a short hand notation for the entire
history, st￿1: For example, ~ bj;t￿1 ￿ ~ bj
￿
st￿1￿




Deriving the relationship between bond prices and the return to deposits in our model involves
studying three possible outcomes on the secondary bond market. Transactions of bonds either
satisfy: (i) ~ bj;t￿1 < bt￿1 for both j 2 fh;lg or (ii) ~ bh;t￿1 = bt￿1 and ~ bl;t￿1 < bt￿1 or (iii) ~ bl;t￿1 = bt￿1
and ~ bh;t￿1 < bt￿1: Here, we sketch the proof of Proposition 1 for case (ii). The proof is obtained in
an analogous fashion for cases (i) and (iii) and is omitted here for brevity.31
In case (ii); the high-risk intermediary increases the amount of resources allocated to risky
investments by selling all bond holdings in the secondary bond market.
B.1 Step 1: Some Key Relationships
In ￿nding and characterizing the equilibrium, it is useful to de￿ne the share of resources a ￿nancial
intermediary retains for risky investment in the primary market, call it xt￿1. Then,




(zt￿1 + dt￿1) (9)
where the second equation was obtained from equation (1):
For the case presented here, high-risk intermediaries use all their bonds as collateral in the
secondary market, while low-risk intermediaries give resources against this collateral. We have:
~ bh;t￿1 = bt￿1 =
1 ￿ xt￿1
pt￿1
(zt￿1 + dt￿1) (10)








(zt￿1 + dt￿1) (11)
Lastly, using equations (8)￿(11); the resources allocated to risky investments by high-risk and
low-risk intermediaries after the secondary market trades are given by (12) and (13):







(zt￿1 + dt￿1) (12)
31The full derivation is available upon request from the authors.









(zt￿1 + dt￿1) (13)
B.2 Step 2: Equilibrium Conditions for the Financial Sector
In what follows, we make use of the equilibrium result lt￿1 = 1.











kt￿1 + ~ pt￿1~ bj;t￿1
￿￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
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1 if Vj;t > 0
0 otherwise
:









kt￿1 + ~ pt￿1~ bj;t￿1
￿￿￿1




￿ ￿j;t￿1 = 0 (14)
where ￿j;t￿1 for j 2 fh;lg are the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints ~ bj;t￿1 ￿ bt￿1 and they





Notice that for the case we are analyzing here, ￿l;t￿1 = 0 and ￿h;t￿1 ￿ 0: Using this, along with























































32In equilibrium, the constraint ￿
kt￿1
~ pt￿1 ￿ ~ bj;t￿1 does not bind as returns to capital invested in risky projects would
become in￿nite.
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pt￿1 (zt￿1 + dt￿1) ￿ Rd
t￿1dt￿1 ￿ Wl;t; 0
9
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pt￿1 (1 ￿ xt￿1)
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(zt￿1 + dt￿1) ￿ Rd




zt￿1 ￿ ￿xt￿1 (zt￿1 + dt￿1) ￿ 0
Let ￿t￿1 be the Lagrange multiplier on the capital regulation constraint. The ￿rst order condi-


































































































33In order to obtain equation (19); we derive the ￿rst order condition with respect to deposits and simplify it by
using the expression in (18):
40B.3 Step 3: Bond Prices
































































Notice that ￿ > 0; unless all ￿nancial intermediaries go broke. Then, equation (20) implies that, in
the absence of capital regulation or if the capital regulation does not bind (i.e. ￿ = 0 or ￿t￿1 = 0),
the primary and secondary market bond prices are equated, ~ pt￿1 = pt￿1: However, if ￿ > 0 and
capital regulation binds ￿t￿1 > 0, then equation (20) implies that ~ pt￿1 < pt￿1:
B.4 Step 4: Primary Market Bond Price and Return to Deposits





















































Using (15) and (16); equation (21) becomes Rd
t￿1 ￿ 1
pt￿1: This completes the proof of Proposi-
tion 1 for the case in which the high-risk intermediary sells all bonds in the secondary bond market.
The other cases are derived analogously, but are omitted here to keep the exposition short.
41C Model Extension: Private Bonds
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< 0 is the quantity of private bonds purchased by foreign investors. In exchange,






in real capital to domestic ￿nancial intermediaries. After
the production takes place, foreigners receive aF
￿
st￿1￿
in return, if the aggregate state is good,
and only 0:9 ￿ aF
￿
st￿1￿
; if the aggregate state is bad.34
34The values of ￿F; ￿ and the recovery rate of 90 percent are arbitrary and were chosen for illustration purposes.
43D Tables





￿1=4 Real interest rate of 4 percent
￿ = 0:29 Capital income share1






Average length of expansions/contractions of business sector
￿l = 0:85; ￿h = 1 ￿ ￿l = 0:15 Sensitivity analysis
1This is the average share for the corporate non￿nancial sector from 1948 to 2009. 2Stigum (1983,
1990) reports values between 0:0013% and 0:008%: We use the upper bound.
44Table 2: Estimated Parameters
Parameter Value
The following parameters are determined jointly to match the moments in Table 3
Share of non￿nancial ￿rms ￿m = 0:6949
Depreciation rate ￿ = 0:0264
Fixed factor income share ￿ = 0:00070317
Productivity parameters
non￿nancial ￿rms qm (s) = 0:9617
qm (s) = 0:9281
low-risk ￿nancial ￿rms ql (s) = 0:9381
ql (s) = 0:9344
high-risk ￿nancial ￿rms qh (s) = 1 (normalization)
qh (s) = 0:6785
45Table 3: Comparison of Data and Model Moments
Moment Data Model
in % in %
Coe¢ cient of variation of output1 3:75 3:94
Coe¢ cient of variation of household net worth2 8:17 9:11
Average maximum decline in output during contractions3 6:48 6:98
Average deposits over total household ￿nancial assets2 17:2 26:0
Recovery rate in case of bankruptcy4 42:0 28:4
Mean output share of non￿nancial sector5 66:9 71:3
Average capital depreciation rate in economy 2:5 2:5
Equity to asset ratio of the ￿nancial sector2;6 7:6 5:2
1Output is measured as the value added for the business sector from 1987Q1 to 2010Q2. This is
also the reference period for the other moments, unless otherwise stated. 2From the U.S. Flow of
Funds accounts. 3This is the absolute decline taking the growth trend into account. 4As reported in
Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2003). 5We identify the non￿nancial sector with the corporate
non￿nancial sector. 6When calculating the equity to asset ratio, we exclude mutual funds.
46Table 4: Welfare and Risk Taking Results Relative to the Social Planner1
Experiment LTCE2 Risk taking3
in % in %
Equilibrium without repo market ￿0:8754 33:1
Optimal interest rate policy ￿0:0431 23:6
Optimal policy ￿0:1 percentage points ￿0:0433 21:1
Optimal policy +0:1 percentage points ￿0:0436 26:2
Optimal interest rate policy and capital regulation ￿0:0444 0:3
1The statistics are computed using 5000-period simulations of the model economy and the planner￿ s
problem. 2Lifetime Consumption Equivalents (LTCE) is the percentage decrease in the optimal
consumption from the social planner problem needed to generate the same welfare as the competitive
equilibrium with a given interest rate policy. 3Risk taking is the percentage deviation in the amount
of resources invested in the high-risk projects in the competitive equilibrium relative to the social
planner￿ s choice. The numbers reported here are averages over expansions and contractions in our
calibrated model. A positive number indicates too much risk taking relative to the social planner,
on average.
47Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis for Fraction of High Risk Intermediaries
Welfare and Risk Taking Results Relative to the Social Planner1
LTCE1 in % Risk taking2 in %
Experiment / ￿h value 0:13 0:15 0:17 0:13 0:15 0:17
Equilibrium without repo market ￿0:7814 ￿0:8754 ￿0:9624 37:4 33:1 29:1
Optimal interest rate policy ￿0:0439 ￿0:0431 ￿0:0397 20:4 23:6 21:6
Optimal policy ￿0:1 percentage points ￿0:0536 ￿0:0433 ￿0:0474 9:4 21:1 13:3
Optimal policy +0:1 percentage points ￿0:4403 ￿0:0436 ￿0:0428 89:4 26:2 30:6
1The statistics are computed using 5000-period simulations of the model economy and the planner￿ s
problem. 2;3See notes to Table 4.
48E Figures
Figure 1: Portfolio Investments in the Primary Market and After Repo Trades
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After repo trades, low-risk intermediary
After repo trades, high-risk intermediary





















































50Figure 3: Benchmark Model: Welfare and Risk Taking Relative to the Social
Planner; Results From 5000-Period Simulations
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52Figure 5: Welfare and Risk Taking Relative to the Social Planner; Results From a
30-quarter Business Cycle Simulation
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